

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1920.

**UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.**

Testimony taken at Washington, D. C., on Saturday, February 28, 1920, by Francis J. Kearful, Esq., in pursuance of an order of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE C. CAROTHERS.

(The witness was duly sworn by Mr. Kearful.)

Mr. KEARFUL. Please state your full name.

Mr. CAROTHERS. George C. Carothers.

Mr. KEARFUL. Where do you live?

Mr. CAROTHERS. My present home is Rochester, N. Y.

Mr. KEARFUL. How long have you lived in Mexico?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Since 1889—from 1889 to 1920. I maintained my home there up to two months ago, but I have not been there personally since 1915.

Mr. KEARFUL. In what business were you engaged?

Mr. CAROTHERS. In mining and real estate.

Mr. KEARFUL. What official position did you hold in Mexico?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I was American consular agent from 1900 until 1913. After that I was representing the State Department as special representative.

Mr. KEARFUL. You are familiar with conditions in Mexico during the time of Diaz, Madero, Huerta, and Carranza?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What were the conditions under Diaz as to security for life and property?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I considered them as equally safe as in the United States.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did law and order prevail?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Absolutely; law and order prevailed everywhere I traveled. I might add that I traveled in the mountain regions on horseback for several years all through the northern part of Mexico.

Mr. KEARFUL. What are the conditions now as contrasted with those you have mentioned?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I consider them to be the opposite.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you mean there is no security anywhere?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Outside of the city of Mexico, and possibly one or two of the larger cities, I would not feel secure, with the exception

of places where there are large rebel groups that do maintain order and where I know that Americans can travel.

Mr. KEARFUL. To what groups do you refer?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I refer to groups in southern Mexico under various commands. They claim to be under the command of Felix Diaz, but there are half a dozen down there in charge of those forces.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you refer to Gen. Meixueiro?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes; Gen. Meixueiro and Higinio Aguilar. I have been told several times that he was dead, but I believe that he is alive.

Mr. KEARFUL. Where did he operate?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He operated in between Vera Cruz and Tabasco, partially, and in the north. I believe an American is safe in almost any part of the north outside of possibly some very tough characters that operate in the mountains west of Chihuahua.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you mean Americans are safe in most places outside of the territory controlled by the Carranza forces?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. KEARFUL. Are you familiar with the nature of reports made by consuls throughout Mexico to the American Government during the latter years of Porfirio Diaz?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Reports from the consuls?

Mr. KEARFUL. Yes. Do you know the nature of those reports?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Do you mean as to commercial development or as to revolutionary conditions?

Mr. KEARFUL. Generally, as to the reports made during the time of Porfirio Diaz. I understand there was no revolution until the outbreak of the Madero revolution.

Mr. CAROTHERS. During the time of Porfirio Diaz, up until I left the consulate, we were instructed to report on all commercial possibilities and commercial developments in our district, and to give information as to new industries that might be opened up. Those reports were published in a book issued by the State Department, and were disseminated throughout the country, both in the United States and Mexico.

Mr. KEARFUL. What did those reports show with reference to opportunities for investment in Mexico and invitation to American citizens to take advantage of those opportunities?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They showed as nearly as possible the conditions existing in the districts from which they emanated, and gave as much detail as they could as to the amount of capital necessary. In many of them they had a number opposite them which indicated that further information could be gotten from the consular bureau in Washington.

Mr. KEARFUL. You have had occasion to examine some of those reports for the purpose of ascertaining their character, have you?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. I received them in my office and kept files of them in my office.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were the business opportunities for investment as shown in those reports promising or otherwise?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I never saw any that were not promising. The only ones that were published were the promising ones, which appeared to be an invitation to Americans to investigate them and showing them a field where they might migrate.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you know whether American citizens generally took advantage of the opportunities set forth in those reports and accepted invitations to go into Mexico and invest their capital and otherwise?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I believe they did. I know that in my consular agency we received numbers of letters regarding different opportunities that developed in the district where I was located. This was done even to the extent of the Mexican Government removing the duty on household goods and machinery and things necessary for the development.

Mr. KEARFUL. Those facts were reported by the consular agents and disseminated throughout the country?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. The evident purpose being to facilitate the movement of citizens of this country to Mexico?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; as an inviting field for American capital.

Mr. KEARFUL. According to your own observation, did American capital take hold of it and go in there?

Mr. CAROTHERS. It did; yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. To a very large extent?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. In my district there were a great many applications for free importation of furniture and household goods for immigrants coming to the Laguna district.

Mr. KEARFUL. You knew about Mr. William Jennings Bryan having made one or two trips to Mexico, did you not?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I knew of one of them that he made when I was in Torreon, but he did not come through Torreon. I heard of him passing through the other sections.

Mr. KEARFUL. Have you seen an article written by him and published in the Commoner, his newspaper, with reference to the opportunities for American citizens in Mexico and inviting them to go there?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I have read the article.

Mr. KEARFUL. You are, of course, familiar with the attitude taken by Mr. Bryan with respect to American citizens who have gone to Mexico after he became Secretary of State?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. I have had numberless people tell me of interviews that they have had with him and statements that he had made to different committees that had gone to see him.

Mr. KEARFUL. How does that attitude compare with the one which was published in the Commoner?

Mr. CAROTHERS. It was entirely different.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was his attitude, so far as you know, with respect to American citizens who had gone there upon invitation of this Government supported by his article in the Commoner?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I always considered that he paid no attention to them at all, that he did not care for their advice or information with regard to conditions there, considering that they had interests in Mexico and would naturally be prejudiced.

Mr. KEARFUL. Because they had interests they were not to be depended upon to tell the truth?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was his attitude toward protecting American interests in Mexico as soon as the first trouble began? What did he advise them to do?

Mr. CAROTHERS. When the first trouble began he was not Secretary of State.

Mr. KEARFUL. After he became Secretary of State, when the real serious troubles began?

Mr. CAROTHERS. His attitude seemed to be a desire to have them get out of Mexico rather than to remain and be a cause of constant worry to the State Department; that he would prefer to have them leave the country and leave what they had there.

Mr. KEARFUL. He ordered them to leave the country?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; he ordered them several times to leave the country.

Mr. KEARFUL. The first orders that were given for Americans to leave the country were given by Mr. Bryan, were they not?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I believe so. I sent out all of the Americans from my district who cared to go, under one of his instructions.

Mr. KEARFUL. Have you ever heard of the position taken by the administration of which Bryan was Secretary of State that Americans operating in Mexico were not entitled to consideration, because they were a group of speculators operating under iniquitous concessions obtained by fraud or bribery from Mexican officials?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Nothing but hearsay with regard to that. I have heard a great deal about that version, and it was generally accepted among the Americans in my district that that was the opinion at Washington.

Mr. KEARFUL. That involves two propositions, the character of Americans operating in Mexico and the nature of the concessions referred to. Will you please state what you observed with reference to the character of the Americans operating in Mexico?

Mr. CAROTHERS. With very few exceptions, the Americans in Mexico were men of very good character. They were industrious, paid their bills, and, with one exception, I never knew of anyone that could not come back to the United States very freely.

Mr. KEARFUL. You do not believe the statements disseminated by Carrancista propagandists in this country that a great many of the Americans were in Mexico because they could not live in the United States?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. That was not true with respect to those Americans in your district?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Absolutely not. The Americans that made money in Mexico that I knew made it by hard work and honorable work.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the nature of the concessions that were granted to foreigners?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I consider that word "concession" is a very much misconstrued word in this country and has led Americans to believe that it is getting something for nothing. I have had considerable to do with the getting of concessions in Mexico, and I always found that while the Mexican Government gave something in return, the concessionaire is always called upon to perform value received. The

usual exemptions in a concession were the free importation of machinery and materials where industries were concerned, and an exemption from taxation for a certain period of years, usually 10 years.

Mr. KEARFUL. A period corresponding somewhat to the prospect of the industry becoming permanently established, is that the idea?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was the concessionaire under obligation to expend certain amounts of money and do certain things in a specified time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He was called upon to invest a certain amount of money within a specified time and also to guarantee the performance of his obligations by the deposit of Government bonds which were subject to forfeiture.

Mr. KEARFUL. You have some knowledge of similar concessions granted by Government authority in this country, have you not, by way of licenses to street railroad companies and gas companies and railroad companies, etc.?

Mr. CAROTHERS. My knowledge is only the common knowledge of reading the newspapers with reference to the franchises that are granted. I would consider a franchise a concession more than a concession is considered in Mexico as being something of value for nothing.

Mr. KEARFUL. According to your knowledge of the franchises or concessions granted for the purpose of inaugurating new enterprises beneficial to the people in this country, how do they compare with those granted in Mexico with reference to liberality?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They are far more liberal in this country. I can cite one instance of one large agricultural company in Mexico that got a concession. The first act that their concession required was the digging of a canal 78 kilometers long, which cost them over a million pesos. It opened up land that was at that time worth practically nothing, while that same land to-day is worth 200 pesos an acre. The only concession that I recollect that they got from the Mexican Government was the water rights from the river—that they would be permitted to take out a certain amount of water from the river.

Mr. KEARFUL. That water was to be used in irrigating large tracts of land?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes; for cotton purposes.

Mr. KEARFUL. And the cultivation of that land would furnish employment to Mexicans?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes. It was originally to furnish employment to foreigners and a large negro colony was taken down there, but afterwards they got out from that part of the concession and were allowed to colonize with Mexicans.

Mr. KEARFUL. Have the operations of the Americans and other foreigners in Mexico tended to an improvement of the condition of the Mexican people, or otherwise?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They have tended to the improvement of them far more than any other nationality. They furnish their employees better houses, pay them better wages, give them better schools, and, you may say, doctors and hospitals. I know it to be a fact that the Mexican laborer prefers to work for an American enterprise rather than any other.

Mr. KEARFUL. Even a Mexican?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes; even a Mexican.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the relation that existed between the Mexican people and the American operators with reference to cordiality and good feeling, before the recent revolution?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They regarded us as warm friends individually, almost without exception. We were cordially received and treated with every hospitality. I personally have traveled through the country and found people to give me a warm welcome everywhere, furnishing me fresh horses and food and taking no pay for it, and such things as that.

Mr. KEARFUL. You have not been able to do that in this country, have you?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were you in Mexico at the time of the inception of the Madero revolution?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. I was consular agent in Torreon at the time.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were you personally acquainted with Madero?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What character of man was he with reference to strength and ability?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He was regarded as a joke when he got into the revolution, but the people of Torreon and vicinity held him in very high esteem personally as a planter. They considered him a vegetarian and dreamer, but an honorable man.

Mr. KEARFUL. How was he esteemed by the members of his own family, his brothers, his father, and his grandfather?

Mr. CAROTHERS. All that I could see of the family before the revolution caused me to think that they seemed to be cordial, but after the revolution the whole family repudiated him even to the extent of issuing public statements, some of which I read at the time, in which they characterized him as being crazy.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you know Gustavo Madero, his brother?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I did; yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. After the success of the Madero revolution, what did you learn with reference to the activities of Gustavo in support of the revolution?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I learned that Gustavo had been supporting it for some time, that he had taken money that he had secured for a mining or industrial enterprise and had financed the revolution with it, and that his first act upon Madero's assumption of the Government was to collect this amount.

Mr. KEARFUL. From the Government?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes; from the Government.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you know from whom the money was obtained by Gustavo in the first instance?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; but I understood it was from foreign investors. I would rather not express an opinion of Gustavo, because he is dead now, but my opinion is not very favorable.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the general understanding in Mexico with reference to the operations of Gustavo after Francisco became president?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He was recognized as the head of the "Porra," as they call them in Mexico. I could not give a description of what

that is except that possibly it means the head of the inside political group of Madero politicians.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was generally considered to be the operation of that group?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Practically the dominating of the president himself in all public matters, forcing him to obey them rather than to follow his leadership.

Mr. KEARFUL. For what purpose, for private or public purpose?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Private purpose, private graft, and I might add power—graft and power.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were you in Torreon at the time of the taking of that city by the Madero forces?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. I can not recall the date, but after the rebels came in Emilio Madero assumed charge.

Mr. KEARFUL. The brother of Francisco?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you have occasion to learn about the massacre of Chinese in Torreon at that time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I had a great deal to do with the stopping of that massacre.

Mr. KEARFUL. By whom were the Chinese massacred?

Mr. CAROTHERS. By the rebels. Nearly all of the Chinamen who were killed were killed in the suburb before the rebels got into the middle of the town.

Mr. KEARFUL. By "rebels" you mean the Madero forces?

Mr. CAROTHERS. The Madero rebels; yes, sir; under the leadership of Benjamin Argumedo, Sixto Ugalde, and Machrino Martinez, and many others.

Mr. KEARFUL. How many Chinese were killed?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Three hundred and three was the official count so far as we could determine it at the time.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the purpose or pretext for killing those Chinese?

Mr. CAROTHERS. The Maderistas thought the Chinamen had been armed by the Federal commander and had assisted in the defense of the city.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was there any evidence of that so far as you could find?

Mr. CAROTHERS. There was evidence that they tried to show me that might be convincing to some people, but it was never convincing to me. They tried to prove that a group of some 30 or 35 Chinamen had fought from one of the Chinese gardens, and that after being run out they had thrown their weapons into a well. I was present when these rifles were taken from the well, and the fact that they were in the well on Chinese property was offered to me as convincing evidence that the Chinamen had used them. I refuted their statement by asking them if the volunteers of Nuevo Leon, who were fighting under the Federal authorities, had not been stationed behind a railroad embankment very close to this Chinese garden, and that it was very possible that the rifles found in that well had belonged to those volunteers. I reported all this fully to the State Department at the time.

Mr. KEARFUL. There was not any pretense, was there, that the Chinese had actually attacked the Madero forces?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They tried to convince me that they had actually attacked them.

Mr. KEARFUL. Simply by showing you some rifles that had afterwards been found in a well?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; and by a hole in a wall which they claimed could not have been made except from a bullet fired from a Chinese laundry which was in front of this wall.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was that convincing?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Why not?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Because I figured that that bullet fired through an adobe wall might make a hole large enough to have been fired from any other direction. It came from the direction of the laundry—yes—but I could not see, as they claimed, that it could only have been fired from that place.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the character of the Chinese there? Was it any different from the well-known pacific character of Chinese generally?

Mr. CAROTHERS. None whatever. You might consider them a model colony. It was under the direct supervision of Sin Chuck, one of the most prominent Chinamen in Mexico.

Mr. KEARFUL. Had any Chinamen ever been known to take part in any politics of the country?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; not that I know of.

Mr. KEARFUL. Or to have done anything in any of the revolutionary movements?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Not that I know of.

Mr. KEARFUL. They did not cite you to any, did they?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you make any effort to prevent the continued massacre of Chinese at that place at that time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. I heard that those Chinamen were being massacred at 7 o'clock in the morning, and I sent a friend of mine in his automobile to find Emilio Madero in order to enter a vigorous protest. Madero came to my house, and I told him that the world would consider this massacre as an outrage, and that it must be stopped. Even he tried to convince me that the rebels had been fired upon by the Chinamen.

Mr. KEARFUL. Emilio Madero himself at first did not want to take steps to stop the killing?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir. He finally agreed to it after some half hour's argument with him and gave orders to concentrate all of the Chinamen in a Chinese bank building that was on the opposite corner from my office. By 8 o'clock that night some 800 Chinamen had been assembled there under a heavy guard. Even after his order had been issued, however, quite a number were killed. I recall one instance where there were 19 assembled in one building on the edge of town, and while they were being driven through the streets toward the bank they were made to run. It had been raining the day before, and the streets were very slippery; and if a Chinaman fell down, they would kill him and tramp on him with their horses. I think 9 out of the 19 arrived at the bank.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did the Chinese offer any resistance at all?

Mr. CAROTHERS. None whatever.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you have any knowledge of the real reason for killing them?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I think it started with the idea that they had been firing on them, but ended up in the looting of the Chinese bodies because the Chinamen all had their money in their shoes, and when they were buried none of the Chinamen had any shoes on. I was told by many people that when a Chinaman was killed they would take his shoes off and search them for money.

Mr. KEARFUL. If the charge that the Chinese were resisting Madristas were a mere pretext, then the actual reason for killing them was to rob them?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. Another reason I believe is that it could be attributed to their desire for blood. They had had no real fighting in taking the city, and when they found they could freely kill the Chinamen, they used that as a sport to satisfy their desire to kill.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did they seem to regard it as sport?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Who was the principal military commander under Madero who achieved the first military successes?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Do you mean in Torreon?

Mr. KEARFUL. In the revolution.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Pascual Orozco.

Mr. KEARFUL. What character of man was Pascual?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I always considered him as a very good man and good leader. He was a man of very mediocre intelligence and education, but he was a good man.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was he friendly to the Americans?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did he commit depredations, or did he protect the people and their property?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I think he tried to protect them, as far as he could personally. All the leaders that tried to protect property down there were handicapped by the fact that a lot of their subordinates would do things that they were given credit for later on. I think Orozco was one of the best of the leaders with regard to protecting property.

Mr. KEARFUL. After Madero's accession to the presidency, do you remember that Orozco revolted?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you know the reason for that?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I think the reason originated in Juarez over the situation when he evacuated. I think there was some serious difficulty between Orozco and Madero, in which Villa interfered at the time. I never knew the details of it.

Mr. KEARFUL. That was before Madero became president?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes; that was before he became president.

Mr. KEARFUL. That difference was patched up, was it not?

Mr. CAROTHERS. It was patched up, but there was always a rankling between them.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you think Orozco had any real grievance against Madero which would justify that revolt?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I do not know enough about that to express an opinion.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was Orozco successful in his revolt?

Mr. CAROTHERS. For a time; yes, sir. Up to the time that Gen. Gonzalez Salas, the Federal commander, met him at this battle field and they both thought they were whipped, Orozco thought he was whipped and Gen. Salas thought he was whipped, and one committed suicide and the other returned, leaving the battle field vacant.

Mr. KEARFUL. Gonzalez Salas committed suicide and Orozco retreated?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. That was practically the end of the revolution then. Huerta then went back to Madero, and he reorganized the Federal army at that time and made a clean sweep from Torreon to Juarez.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were you in Mexico at the time of the downfall of Madero?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I was in Torreon.

Mr. KEARFUL. Prior to that time, what was the sentiment of the people in the region with reference to Madero?

Mr. CAROTHERS. At first they were very enthusiastic, but within a very short time after they realized that Madero's family had really gotten in control of the Government, they became dissatisfied and convinced that there was more trouble in sight—that is, that Madero could not rule.

Mr. KEARFUL. How was the downfall of Madero received by the Mexicans in that region?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Torreon went to Huerta right away.

Mr. KEARFUL. They were satisfied with the change from Madero to Huerta?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; everybody felt a great relief. They seemed to think that by that change in Mexico City, it would really bring a settlement of the entire situation.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was it the idea that Huerta could reestablish the system of Porfirio Diaz?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. And they had confidence in that?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They had confidence in that. What I mean by the system of Gen. Diaz was up to the time Gen. Diaz himself controlled the Government, because for several years prior to his downfall he had very little to do with the Government.

Mr. KEARFUL. But they had lost confidence in Madero and wished to revert to the system established by Porfirio Diaz?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was that the general sentiment in the country?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. They believed Huerta was the man to do that?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the condition of business and property interests under the rule of Huerta? Was property and life secure under Huerta?

Mr. CAROTHERS. We felt so; yes, sir. We felt an antagonism a very short time after Huerta took control when he did not get recognition at once; we felt a tightening up against Americans.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did that go to the extent of hostility toward Americans, active hostility?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; it did not go that far.

Mr. KEARFUL. When did the first hostility toward Americans manifest itself?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I should say when Mr. Lind was sent to Mexico it became the most manifest.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did that hostility manifest itself in any acts prior to the landing of the forces at Vera Cruz?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I do not think so.

Mr. KEARFUL. Even after the landing at Vera Cruz in the territory controlled by Huerta did Americans receive protection?

Mr. CAROTHERS. As far as I know, they did; yes, sir. I am referring to hostility in territory occupied and controlled by Huerta at that time.

Mr. KEARFUL. You were in Mexico at the time of the outbreak of the Carranza revolution against Huerta?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Who was the principal military man who contributed to the early success of the Carranza revolution?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I would consider that the Carranza revolution had never had any successes to amount to anything until Villa took charge and gained several very important victories over the federals. Carranza had operated in the northern part of the State of Coahuila and had been run out from there and gone overland to Sonora. The Huerta forces were coming north and they had met with material success.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you think the success of the Carranza revolution was due to Villa?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the first principal victory obtained by Villa?

Mr. CAROTHERS. The first big victory was the attack on Torreon.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were you there at that time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was Carranza there?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir. Carranza was in Sonora.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did he go to Torreon shortly afterwards?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Very much later; many months later.

Mr. KEARFUL. How was Carranza regarded by the military men under Villa at that time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They regarded him as chief of the revolution, but he was so far away that his influence was not felt. They relied entirely on Villa.

Mr. KEARFUL. How was he treated when he came to Torreon?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He went to Juarez first on his way to Torreon, and when he got to Torreon the effect of his coming over was not felt so much. The treatment that he received was more noticeable in Chihuahua and Juarez than in Torreon. There was considerable antagonism against him by the time he arrived in Torreon. He stopped there only a day, I think.

Mr. KEARFUL. What occurred with reference to the property interests of people in Torreon when it was taken by Villa?

Mr. CAROTHERS. The city of Torreon had regarded Villa's acts in Parral as indicating that he would do the same thing when he reached Torreon, and everyone feared that he would loot the city. His attack commenced about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The federals evacuated at 8 o'clock, and by 11 o'clock Villa was in full possession of the city and had a guard on every street corner.

The only rioting that occurred in Torreon was on the first two streets, in which some 10 or 15 stores were looted principally for the purpose of getting hats and shoes. None of the Villistas had any hats, as one of the signals they had decided on among themselves was that they would wear no hats so they could recognize each other, and so they left their hats out in the hills.

Mr. KEARFUL. What occurred with reference to looting?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They looted some 10 or 15 stores, but this was stopped within a very short time and several of the looters were killed.

Mr. KEARFUL. Executed for looting?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. By 11 o'clock at night the city was very quiet and guards stationed on every street corner. The next morning at daylight I sent a communication to Gen. Villa asking protection for Americans and their property, and within an hour a squad of 25 men and an officer appeared with a letter from Villa stating that he sent these men to guard American property and that they would take orders from me as to where to be stationed. At 11 o'clock in the morning I went to his headquarters and saw him for the first time. I had never seen him before.

Mr. KEARFUL. In Villa's subsequent operations did he manifest respect for property rights or not?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was his attitude toward Americans?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I always considered him to be a real friend of the Americans. He did everything possible in issuing orders stopping any outrages against American property.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the secret of the power of Villa over his men?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He possessed both the fear and the love of his men.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was his attitude in regard to Federal prisoners at places taken by him?

Mr. CAROTHERS. During his first battles he killed all his prisoners; but after he had a conference with Gen. Scott on the border, at which time Gen. Scott gave him a little book on the rules of war, he changed, and at the taking of Torreon the Federals left their hospitals full of wounded under the care of the British vice consul to be turned over to Villa when he took the city.

Mr. KEARFUL. What happened to the prisoners?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They were treated with the same care as the Villa wounded.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you attribute that to the influence of Gen. Scott and the rules of war that he gave Villa?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the custom previously about the killing of prisoners among Mexicans generally?

MR. CAROTHERS. It was on the basis of an eye for an eye. The Federals killed all of their prisoners, and it was a matter of reprisal.

MR. KEARFUL. It was not an uncommon thing for either side to kill prisoners?

MR. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

MR. KEARFUL. How did the attitude of Carranza toward Americans compare with that of Villa?

MR. CAROTHERS. Carranza was a stickler always for great formality, and he would never act immediately and openly with us. He would receive a representation and take it under consideration and insist on telegraphing for information, and seemed always to hesitate and think that he would be criticized by his officers for catering to the United States.

MR. KEARFUL. Can you illustrate the difference between the attitude of Villa and Carranza by reference to the positions they took at the time of the Vera Cruz landing?

MR. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. I have some copies of some reports I made at that time.

MR. KEARFUL. I notice that in the answer of Gen. Carranza, transmitted through you to Mr. Bryan, that he stated that he considered acts committed at Vera Cruz as acts highly offensive to the dignity and independence of Mexico and contrary to our reiterated declarations of not desiring to sever the state of peace and friendship with the Mexican nation, and that the reply of Carranza was generally antagonistic and truculent, whereas the answer of Villa as reported by you to President Wilson was conciliatory and friendly in its tone.

MR. CAROTHERS. That is true.

MR. KEARFUL. Does that illustrate the difference in character between the two men?

MR. CAROTHERS. Yes. It would be difficult for me to go into detail of the merits of those two reports, but I felt constantly an antagonism in my dealings with Carranza and I never felt anything of that kind with Villa. Those two incidents strengthen that conviction that I had at that time. Villa came to the border after Carranza sent his note. I understand that Villa had some words with Carranza in Chihuahua and that he took the train and came up to the border and the people of El Paso had heard that Villa was coming up with nine trains of soldiers to attack El Paso. The military made great preparations and trained their guns on Juarez and were ready to fight. When I heard Villa was over across the river I went over to see him immediately, and found him there with a very small guard around his house within 200 yards of the border. I had dinner with him that night. When I went back at 11 o'clock I telegraphed the State Department what he had told me.

MR. KEARFUL. What did Villa say and what was his attitude about the incident? Just state it in your own words, if you remember what he said.

MR. CAROTHERS. He said that no act of Huerta's would change his feeling of freindship toward the United States and embroil him in a fight with us; that Carranza had replied in a telegram that he had not approved of at all; that he had deemed it best to come to the border and see that the relations were kept cordial.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you remember that the day following the landing at Vera Cruz Mr. Bryan sent an explanation of that operation to Carranza and Villa?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes.

Mr. KEARFUL. In that telegram instructions were given to make known the President's position, and the President's position was stated in these words:

The President does not hold any resolution that could be construed as authorizing him to engage in war. All he asks and all that would be given is a resolution declaring that he is justified in using the armed forces to compel redress of a specific indemnity.

Then I omit some and read further:

The taking of the customhouse at Vera Cruz was made necessary by Huerta's refusal to make proper reparation for the arrest of the American sailors.

Do you remember the incident referred to by the statement "arrest of the American sailors?"

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I only know about that by hearsay, though, of what happened in Tampico.

Mr. KEARFUL. It is a matter of common knowledge that some American sailors were arrested there and that a salute was demanded to the American flag, and as that salute was refused, the taking of Vera Cruz followed?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. You understand the explanation given by Bryan to be that the taking of the customhouse at Vera Cruz was a measure made necessary by the Tampico flag incident?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I understood that was his reason for it; yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. He states that it was made necessary by Huerta's refusal to make proper reparation for the arrest of American sailors?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. And that the arrest of American sailors referred to the Tampico incident?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. In that connection I will refer to statements made in the Democratic campaign textbook in 1916. On page 56 it was said:

We took Vera Cruz to show Mexico that Huerta, the despot and murderer in temporary authority at Mexico City, must go.

On page 68 it was said:

The American forces were not sent to Vera Cruz to compel the salute to the American flag. When Huerta refused the President's ultimatum, he created a need that more complete reparation be given for his offenses. That was the sort of reparation which the President was intent upon procuring. In a word, it was to break the waning power of the dictator and to bring his bloody reign to an end, since in no other way could normal international relations be restored. A stoppage of the delivery of a shipment of arms on board the German steamship *Yperanga*, consigned to Huerta, which was due at Vera Cruz the morning of the seizure, was but an incidental consideration in the order for the capture of that port. The fact that arms later reached the Mexicans through another port is irrelevant to the weighing of the Vera Cruz incident, for it did not alter the certainty that the President's main purpose would be realized.

Is it not apparent to you that the explanation given by Mr. Bryan on the day following the landing at Vera Cruz was not the truth, if

the statements subsequently written in the Democratic campaign textbook for 1916 were true?

Mr. CAROTHERS. That is very apparent. I think that Carranza's reply indicates that they did not consider that those were the motives at all.

Mr. KEARFUL. You think Carranza attempted to make it plain that he did not believe what Bryan said in explanation?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. According to the Democratic textbook, Carranza was right?

Mr. CAROTHERS. It seems so.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you receive any instructions from Mr. Bryan with reference to negotiating for peace between Carranza and Villa?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What were those instructions?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He impressed on me in two letters that I received the necessity of keeping them together.

Mr. KEARFUL. In one letter which you have, dated June 24, 1914, addressed to you and signed by Mr. Bryan, he states in the last paragraph as follows:

Do not overlook any opportunity to advise Carranza and Villa against any falling out. It is essential to the case of the constitutionalists that they work harmoniously together.

You received that letter, did you?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I did. I considered those as instructions to continue along those lines, and I used every effort that I could to keep them together and to prevent any breach.

Mr. KEARFUL. You also have a letter signed by Mr. Bryan addressed to you dated August 11, 1914, and with that letter was a statement dated July 23, which appeared to be prepared by President Wilson. Is that correct?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. In the statement of July 23 is this language:

We have been forced by circumstances into a position in which we must practically speak for the rest of the world. It is evident that the United States is the only first-class power that can be expected to take the initiative in recognizing the new Government. It will in effect act as the representative of the other powers of the world in this matter and will unquestionably be held responsible for the consequences.

In Mr. Bryan's letter of August 11, 1914, is this statement:

If, in July, it appeared that we spoke for the rest of the world, you will recognize the increased seriousness of our position to-day. Consul Silliman has been instructed to use his good offices with Gen. Carranza and you are to do the same with Gen. Villa to the end that their differences may be adjusted and their progress may be harmonious from this time forward.

The statement that the administration of this Government was speaking for the rest of the world and was acting as the representative of the other powers of the world and would be held responsible by them for the consequences, indicates some agreement between this Government and the other powers of the world with respect to Mexico. Do you know anything about such agreement?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir. I heard from several sources, that I can not now remember, that some agreement had been reached to that effect, but I had no definite knowledge of it.

MR. KEARFUL. You do not know that this Government agreed with foreign powers to be responsible to them and their nationals for what might occur in Mexico, in consideration that this country being given a free hand in Mexico?

MR. CAROTHERS. No, sir; but from the sources of information that I had at that time, it was my impression that such an agreement had been reached and that we were responsible, and that one of the reasons other countries were not taking active steps to protect their people and their property was that we were looking after them. That belief was strengthened by the insistence of the department that Carranza, during the time he was in Sonora and in Chihuahua, should receive representations through us for other nationalities which he always opposed, and he demanded that representatives of the other nations be sent directly to him. In all my representations with Carranza this was always one of the stumbling blocks that I had with him to get him to listen to me with regard to other foreigners than Americans.

MR. KEARFUL. What was Villia's estimate of Carranza?

MR. CAROTHERS. I do not know that Carranza and Villa ever met until they met in Chihuahua, and I think that his estimate was formed entirely by hearsay until he met him. He always declared to me that he recognized Carranza as the head of the revolution, and up to the time of the Torreon split he insisted that he was true to Carranza, but I always considered that he had formed an antagonism toward Carranza because he was convinced that Carranza was trying to belittle him, that Carranza was always making little of his victories and trying to surround him with obstacles, to always place obstacles in his path, and in reports that were made about matters in territory controlled by Villa he did not want to mix in with them and did not want to assume the responsibility. Villa was antagonistic to him almost from the day they met in Chihuahua on that account, although he claimed that he was true to him and loyal.

MR. KEARFUL. I notice in a letter which you wrote to Secretary Bryan, dated July 5, 1914, in speaking of Villa's attitude toward Carranza, you said:

He considers that Carranza is surrounded by politicians who are feathering their nests and laying the foundation for a far more despotic government than ever before.

Was that a correct statement of Villa's attitude at that time?

MR. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; that is part of his attitude.

MR. KEARFUL. What have subsequent developments shown with reference to the correctness of that estimate?

MR. CAROTHERS. I think the subsequent developments have fully justified the estimate.

MR. KEARFUL. In your efforts toward carrying out the mission of protecting American rights and negotiating for the removal of differences between Carranza and Villa, did you have the cordial support of the Washington authorities?

MR. CAROTHERS. No, sir. I never felt that I had any support. I felt that I was being left alone on my own initiative. I felt it was like pulling teeth to get any expression out of them. The only expressions that I ever got from them were the two to which I have just referred. I felt that they were not paying attention to the Mexican situation.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you come to Washington at various times for conference with Mr. Bryan?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. I came here twice after I was made special representative and I had hoped to be able to see the President.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you ever get to see the President?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir. He expressed a desire to see me on the day that Mrs. Wilson died, but owing to her severe illness he had to postpone it and I left without seeing him.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were your conferences with Mr. Bryan satisfactory?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir. Mr. Bryan seemed always to wish that I would end the interview. I wanted to talk to him and get some light on the situation, but he never would open up and tell me anything that I wanted to know. After he left the secretaryship, Mr. Lansing took it over and I never did get to see Mr. Lansing. I saw Mr. Polk for five minutes when he was acting secretary. I felt that I was alone in my efforts there.

Mr. KEARFUL. Please state briefly, what were the circumstances of the first break between Villa and Carranza?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Villa had received orders to reinforce Gen. Natera, who was attacking the city of Zacatecas. Villa protested against such an order as he considered that Natera had already been repulsed, and that if he went down with 3,000 men, that he would also be repulsed; and Carranza told him he was commander in chief, and that he must obey orders, and Villa refused to go. That led to other recriminations on both sides, and brought about the split. I was in Torreon at the time, and I felt the split coming, and I went to Villa and requested that he hold off several days. I think that my interview with him was on Tuesday, and he promised to wait until Saturday. I took a train and went to Saltillo and arrived there on Wednesday, and tried to get an interview with Carranza through his minister of foreign relations. But I was and am convinced that Carranza purposely held me off until after the split would come. I did not get to see him until Saturday afternoon, when he informed me that he had just finished a telephonic conference with Villa, in which he, Villa, had resigned his command and that the following day his successor would be chosen by a meeting of generals in Torreon. I urged upon him the necessity of patching up the break, but he appeared to be overjoyed that the breach had come, and he would not listen to my reasoning. I reported the conditions to Washington that night and returned to Torreon the following morning.

Do you want me to describe the patching up of that break afterwards?

Mr. KEARFUL. Presently. What attitude did the generals of the division of the north under the command of Villa take with reference to Villa's resignation?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They refused to permit Villa to resign and defied Carranza, and said that they would desert from his standard and follow Villa.

Mr. KEARFUL. And Villa was not permitted by them to resign?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What, then, was done with reference to reconciliation between Villa and Carranza?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Villa took the whole army and went to Zacatecas, and whipped Huerta, and telegraphed his victory to Carranza, as he had done before. In the meantime the Carranza generals in command of the other divisions had approached Carranza and secured his permission to go to Torreon and try to patch up the difference between them. This commission was sent over under—do you want the names of the men that went?

Mr. KEARFUL. It is not necessary.

Mr. CAROTHERS. And they came to an agreement, which I forwarded to Washington at the time. This agreement apparently patched up their differences.

Mr. KEARFUL. Leaving Villa in command of the division of the north?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Leaving Villa in command of the division of the north. But, as I informed Washington, the agreement did not seem to me to settle the difference.

Mr. KEARFUL. To what do you attribute the difficulty or the impossibility of removing the differences? Was it the attitude of Villa or Carranza?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Carranza was intensely jealous of Villa or Villa victories, and the confidence that Villa had gained at the time. He seemed to be overshadowing Carranza in Carranza's estimation.

Mr. KEARFUL. Have you observed that attitude on the part of Carranza with reference to any other generals subsequently?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; and all through the revolution, and several others besides, and when he went to Sonora. His first arrival was in Sinaloa, and Gen. Rivera, the constitutional governor, helped him in every way possible, and placed himself under his command. He went to Sonora, and Mr. Maytorena, in Sonora, also received him with open arms. He was not there two weeks before the Pesqueira faction brought about difficulties between him and Maytorena and Rivera, and he tried to oust both of them. The same thing happened with Gen. Angeles, almost identical.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the Angeles incident?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I attributed it to his jealousy. He sent Angeles to join Villa. I do not recall any special incident except that Angeles abandoned him when the split came and joined Villa's side.

Mr. KEARFUL. Subsequently when Villa was defeated by Obregon, and driven to the North, after he had been in Mexico City, what was the attitude of Carranza toward Obregon?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Also one of jealousy toward Obregon.

Mr. KEARFUL. What do you know of the operation of that attitude of Carranza toward Obregon? How did it manifest itself?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I do not know the particulars, but I know that it forced Obregon to either fight him or get out. I know Obregon chose to get out of the cabinet and to go back to Sonora into the garbanzo business as a private citizen.

Mr. KEARFUL. You observed then that Carranza has always taken the position actuated by jealousy which necessitated his successful military leaders either to fight him or to leave the army.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. And in the case of Villa he determined to fight him?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. With what success?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He succeeded up to the time of this Silao battle, and it seemed as though Villa was going to win out.

Mr. KEARFUL. I want you to state what he did, and how he did it?

Mr. CAROTHERS. What Villa did?

Mr. KEARFUL. Yes.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Well, he organized a very large army and equipped it, better than an army has ever been equipped in Mexico; that is, as to discipline, and he went under the advice of Gen. Angeles to a very great extent. Wherever he would go he installed a very satisfactory government to the people that were there. He even took possession of Mexico City and made peace with Zapata, and held a convention in Aguascalientes, where he endeavored to have Carranza and his faction participate.

Mr. KEARFUL. The first entry of the Carranza forces into Mexico City occurred at the time when Carranza and Villa were operating together, did it not, when they were reconciled?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. In August, 1914?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. The split took place very shortly afterwards.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the occasion of the break that occurred after that?

Mr. CAROTHERS. It was over the convention that Carranza tried to hold in Mexico City, and Villa refused to attend it, because he claimed that Carranza would have a packed convention and would have himself proclaimed as president.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the original plan under which they were all fighting?

Mr. CAROTHERS. The plan of Guadalupe, in which a convention would be held—I do not recollect all of the conditions. There were very few in the Guadalupe convention, or that Guadalupe plan, but Villa did not consider that the Mexico City convention would follow out the promises that had been made.

Mr. KEARFUL. What were the promises?

Mr. CAROTHERS. That an election would be called at once.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was it in reference to the convention?

Mr. CAROTHERS. That this convention would not be a representative convention.

Mr. KEARFUL. But what was the promise in reference to a convention, and what the convention would do? As I understand it, it was that a convention would be called immediately upon the entrance into Mexico City for the purpose of selecting a provisional president.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Who would rule until the election should be called?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; that was the promise.

Mr. KEARFUL. And Villa refused to attend the convention called by Carranza in Mexico City because of his conviction that Carranza would pack the convention and instead of having a provisional president appointed would have himself appointed and would not hold elections.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; that was Villa's conviction.

Mr. KEARFUL. Then, what was done with reference to holding a convention?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Gen. Obregon and a party of Carranza's officers held several conferences with Villa on the Plan of Guadalupe in Zacatecas and they finally agreed upon holding a convention in Aguascalientes, which would be neutralized, and this convention was held. It was held up to the time that Carranza refused to recognize it, when the Carranza delegates realized that Carranza was not going to sanction the provisional President that was named at that convention, and the Carranza delegates stole the flag that they had all kissed and signed, and deserted the convention.

Mr. KEARFUL. You refer to the flag that they had all signed and kissed. Was that supposed to be a very solemn ceremony at the opening of the convention at which they all pledged their honor to abide by the decisions of the convention?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; it was a very solemn occasion. Some of them even cried, wept, when they signed it and kissed it.

Mr. KEARFUL. And afterwards when the Carranza delegates bolted they stole the flag?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was Villa's attitude toward the convention held at Aguascalientes?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He agreed to abide by its decisions.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did he have military control of that region, such as to coerce the convention?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; he was up at Guadalupe Station, which is, I should judge, 100 miles or more away, and the forces that were in control at Aguascalientes were a combination of the two forces, and there were very few in the city. It do not believe there were over 500 men in the whole city.

Mr. KEARFUL. Of what was this convention composed?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Supposed to be composed of delegates from Sonora, from the Zapata government, and the Villa elements, and the Carranza delegates, who had come up authorized to represent Carranza, presumably.

Mr. KEARFUL. How were those delegates selected?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I could not tell you.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were they selected by the different armies, one man to each thousand under arms?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I think they were sent by the controlling leaders in those sections.

Mr. KEARFUL. They were all generals, were they not?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No; there were a lot of civilians—lawyers, doctors.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you think it was a representative convention, really representing the people of Mexico?

Mr. CAROTHERS. It was the most representative convention that ever was held in Mexico, and they had more freedom of speech than ever had been witnessed in Mexico.

Mr. KEARFUL. At what time was that convention at Aguascalientes operating?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Mr. Canova, who had been sent down to work with me, was reporting on the convention. I find among my papers

a copy of a document handed me by him showing that Gutierrez was the President elected by the convention November 12, 1914.

Mr. KEARFUL. The convention was functioning during October, 1914?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; October and November; part of October and part of November, 1914.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the result of the convention?

Mr. CAROTHERS. The election of Eulalio Gutierrez as a provisional President and the naming of Villa as commander in chief of the army and the declaration of Carranza as a rebel.

Mr. KEARFUL. What did the convention forces of Villa do then?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They proceeded south immediately to Mexico City, where they arrived on the 1st of December, without any fighting.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were you in Mexico City at that time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I was with Villa.

Mr. KEARFUL. At the time of his entrance into Mexico City?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes; I had my car attached to his train.

Mr. KEARFUL. What occurred between Villa and Emiliano Zapata, who was operating in the State of Morelos?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They held a meeting at Xochimilco, a suburb of Mexico City, in which they came to a definite understanding, and they made a triumphal entry into Mexico City the next day, with both their armies, their combined armies.

Mr. KEARFUL. Those Zapatistas had previously driven the Carrancistas out of Mexico City?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; and the Zapatistas were in charge of the City of Mexico and in control of it.

Mr. KEARFUL. How did the people of Mexico City receive the Zapatistas?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I was told that they first feared them, but after they took possession of the city they were very much pleased to see that the soldiery was humble and respectful, and that they had done no looting at all. I remember of no instance of their looting places.

Mr. KEARFUL. They protected the property of the inhabitants?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They protected the property of the inhabitants.

Mr. KEARFUL. They feared them because of the stories they heard about the savagery of the followers of Zapata?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes.

Mr. KEARFUL. And they found that they were not that sort of people?

Mr. CAROTHERS. That they were just humble peasants with guns in their hands.

Mr. KEARFUL. You say that you were told that? That was the sentiment of the people of the city?

Mr. CAROTHERS. That was the sentiment; I was told that by the people of the city as well as the foreign representatives of the Diplomatic Corps. I was invited to attend an afternoon tea at the Brazilian Minister's home where I met all the Diplomatic Corps, and they all commented on the conduct of the Zapatistas; and the principal thing that they wanted to impress upon me was the hope that Villa would continue along the same lines.

Mr. KEARFUL. You say that Villa and Zapata had met and agreed to cooperate?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did they do so?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They did so. One of the terms of this agreement was that Villa would go north and take over the coal fields and the oil fields, and Zapata would stay in the city and clean up from Mexico City to Vera Cruz.

Mr. KEARFUL. Where was Carranza then?

Mr. CAROTHERS. At Vera Cruz. Zapata only got as far as Puebla and his Indian troops wanted to go home to Morelos to their farms. His army practically disintegrated at Puebla, which permitted Carranza to reorganize an army in Vera Cruz under Gen. Obregon.

Mr. KEARFUL. And what did Villa do?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Villa went north to see Gen. Scott at the border. His immediate purpose was to see Scott.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were you present at the meeting between Scott and Villa?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you know of any promise having been made by Scott to Villa by way of recognition of him in case he would comply with certain conditions?

Mr. CAROTHERS. None whatever.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was the purpose of the meeting?

Mr. CAROTHERS. The trouble arising at the New Mexico border in which one of the Villa adherents, Gen. Maytorena was attacking Naco and several Americans had been killed on the American side, and the object was to have Villa order Maytorena to withdraw. Villa applied to Scott for eight hours in which to attack the town, if the Americans would withdraw for eight hours, that he would attack the town, and Scott very patiently denied it, and finally told him—

Mr. KEARFUL. You mean, if the Americans would withdraw from the proximity of the battle?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes; if the Americans would withdraw from the proximity of the battle, and Gen. Scott finally told him that he would crack him if he did not withdraw. Those are the words that Gen. Scott used, and I translated them very carefully to Villa in the same terms exactly, but there were no promises made of any kind.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you know of any other meeting between Villa and Scott at which you were not present?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you meet a man named M. L. Hall at the time of the taking of Mexico City by the Zapatistas, or shortly after that?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. What was he doing there?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He was posing as the personal representative of Mr. Wilson, the President.

Mr. KEARFUL. What did he have to show for that assumption of authority?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I requested Zapata's private secretary Palafox to show me the credentials that Mr. Hall had presented to them, and he showed me a letter signed by Mr. Davis, the Secretary of the State Department, in which he asked for any courtesies that they could extend to Mr. Hall in pursuit of information for the Smithsonian Institute, I think. I am not sure about that, or it might have men-

tioned for agricultural purposes. I think he was getting information for the agricultural section of the Smithsonian Institute. That letter referred to him in that sense, and not in any manner as a diplomatic agent.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you have any conversation with Hall at that time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Oh, yes; yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. And what was he doing there?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He seemed to be gathering information for the Government more than anything else.

Mr. KEARFUL. What sort of information, about agriculture?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No; political information. He seemed to be pleading the Zapata cause.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did he tell you about any operation that he had had in connection with John Lind, the President's personal representative, who was sent down to eliminate Huerta?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Did Hall tell me?

Mr. KEARFUL. Yes.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Not that I recollect.

Mr. KEARFUL. He did not tell you about any arrangement he had with Lind at the time that Huerta was in power for Zapata to come in and take Mexico City?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; I do not remember anything to that effect.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did it not occur to you as peculiar that a man should be sent down there with credentials to gather information about agriculture, and then be exerting himself to get political information and become an advocate of one of the factions?

Mr. CAROTHERS. It appeared so strange to me that I called the attention of the Secretary of State to his presence and asked him to tell Mr. Hall to cease claiming to be a personal representative of the President.

Mr. KEARFUL. And what was done then?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Nothing that I know of.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you get any information while you were operating in Mexico with reference to the machinations of the Japanese?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I sent in a report once, reporting an interview that I had with Gen. Villa, in which he told me in Mexico City that a Japanese officer, a naval officer, had called on him. I reported to the Secretary of State the result of that meeting. I have it here.

Mr. KEARFUL. Your report is dated February 5, 1915, and contains the following:

Gen. Villa told me that when he was in Mexico City in December there was a Japanese warship in Mexican waters, and the commander of the vessel went to Mexico City to see him. He wanted to meet Villa and presumably wanted to sound Villa as to his feelings toward the United States. As a feeler he told Gen. Villa that his country was greatly grieved against us and that they were preparing for war with us; that it would take them two years more in their preparation, as they had been preparing for three years. Gen. Villa told me that he replied to him that the people of the United States were his friends, and that in case of a war with any other country excepting Mexico the resources of Mexico would be at the disposal of the United States if he (Villa) had anything to do with the Government at the time. Villa says that the man seemed deeply disappointed and did not broach the real object of his

visit. When Gen. Scott was in El Paso Villa hinted at this to him, but there were too many people at the conference for him to speak plainly.

Gen. Villa was deeply impressed with what he was told, and his sincerity in saying that the resources of his country would be at the disposal of the United States is unquestionable. I have had several long conversations with him, traveling along in his car, and I am absolutely convinced that he had a very warm affection for all good Americans, and he is doing his very best to give protection to our people's lives and property.

Is that a correct statement of the information that you received from Villa at that time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you have any reason to believe that Villa was telling you about something that had not occurred, or wanted to deceive you in any way?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir. His whole demeanor at that time when he told me seemed as though he had some very important information to give me.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you know how the State Department regarded it, whether as important or otherwise?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; I do not know.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you receive any instructions to follow the matter up and make any further investigations about it?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you subsequently obtain any further information from any other Mexicans in reference to the operations of the Japanese in Mexico?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I discovered a circular printed in Japanese and Spanish in El Paso, which I followed up with all the information I could obtain regarding the senders of it, who were San Francisco Japanese, but I never heard any more about it. I afterwards heard that that circular had been freely distributed throughout the United States.

Mr. KEARFUL. Have you a copy of the circular?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you remember the substance of what it contained?

Mr. CAROTHERS. As I remember, the substance was telling the Mexicans to continue their fight against the United States, and they would have the support of the Japanese. The men in San Francisco who signed this, I afterwards heard, were merchants, but they were not officials of Japan.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you obtain any other information from the Mexicans about the Japanese, from the Mexican soldiers?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I had a conversation once with a Mexican general in San Antonio. He told me that he had been an officer—I think I have a memorandum of that notice—

Mr. KEARFUL. You made a report, dated February 7, 1916, on that matter. In that report you stated the following:

I attach some importance to one point mentioned to me by a Mexican general in my interview yesterday. He was a military commander at Mazatlan under the Diaz régime, and he intimated to me that he knew of a secret agreement made between the Diaz Government and Japan as to a naval base on Mexican soil, and that there is more truth than is generally believed in the present agitation in California; that the Japs are gaining a foothold in Lower California, and that when the time comes they will exhibit the agreement that they made in

order to justify their present action. It will not surprise me to hear that the Japs have landed and cached large quantities of arms and ammunition along the west coast of Mexico for the purpose of supplying the revolutionists with the understanding that their former agreement be upheld.

Is that a correct statement of the interview that you had with that Mexican general?

Mr. CAROTHERS. It is; yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you know an official of the American Government named Frank Rabb?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I do not know him personally. I know of him.

Mr. KEARFUL. What official position did he hold?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Collector of the port at Brownsville, Tex.

Mr. KEARFUL. On March 25, 1915, you transmitted to the department a communication received by you from Gen. Villa, which reads as follows:

We have intercepted the following correspondence, which I send to you for your information and with the object that you please forward it to Mr. West. A letter addressed as follows:

LICENCIADO ELISEO ARREDONDO,
Embajada Mexicana:

I have an intimate personal friend who has been lending me his valuable assistance in his capacity of a high employee of the American Government, for the good of our cause, and who at the same time is intimately connected with several Senators and Congressmen in Washington, especially those from the State of Texas, and who is also intimately connected with the members of the cabinet in the State of Texas. Inasmuch as he is a decided partisan of ours now that there are many dangers surrounding the definite triumph of our cause, he offers me his most valuable assistance to go and work at your side making use of his great influence with the following Senators and Congressmen, who for many reasons are under great obligations to him: Senators Sheppard and Culberson, Congressmen from Iowa, Attorney General Gregory, and Postmaster General Burleson. These men have great influence in the politics of Texas, and they will all take special interest in what my friend will recommend. I believe that in the present circumstances my friend can be of inestimable value to you in securing from the American Government recognition of our constitutionalist government in Mexico. Please telegraph me if you accept his generous offer which is without expectation of remuneration more than the expenses occasioned by his trip. Authorize me to defray the necessary expense for me to accompany him personally and present him to you. My friend has great faith in his ability to obtain recognition for our cause. If you accept his services, please keep the matter strictly confidential.

JOSÉ L. GARZA.

The person mentioned by Garza is Mr. Rabb, collector of customs of Brownsville, Tex., and an intimate friend of Lucio Blanco and Villareal.

FRANCISCO VILLA.

Mr. CAROTHERS. I understand that Mr. Rabb had been living with Gen. Blanco in Mexico City, and that he and Blanco had formed a scheme for acquiring some large tracts of ranch property in the States of Jalisco and Zacatecas.

Mr. KEARFUL. You say that Mr. Rabb was living with Gen. Blanco in Mexico City? Did you have any information about the place where Gen. Blanco was living?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; he was living in Mr. Casusus's house that Blanco had seized.

Mr. KEARFUL. It was the residence of Casusus, a lawyer in Mexico City, who had been prominent in the régime of Porfirio Diaz?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes; and he had been an ambassador to Washington. I afterwards visited Blanco in the same house.

Mr. KEARFUL. Was it customary for the Carrancista officers to take possession of the houses at the places where they entered?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; everywhere.

Mr. KEARFUL. They did not do that in Mexico City?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. And what became of the contents of those houses, according to your observation?

Mr. CAROTHERS. They were looted, and I understand that a great deal of the loot was shipped to the United States and sold in the United States.

Mr. KEARFUL. And Frank Rabb, an official of the United States, reputed to be a close friend of the members of the cabinet, was living in this house with Gen. Blanco?

Mr. CAROTHERS. So I understood.

Mr. KEARFUL. I can tell you that your understanding was correct, because I personally visited him while he was there. You say that Villa's attitude toward Americans while you were engaged in negotiating with him as the representative of this Government was friendly?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. When did that attitude change, if at all?

Mr. CAROTHERS. After the permit was given by the United States to transport troops through American territory to Douglas, Ariz., for the purpose of defending the city of Agua Prieta against Villa, who had made a long trip across the mountains with his whole army to try and get a new start in Sonora.

Mr. KEARFUL. This permit was given to the Carrancistas by the United States?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; by the United States.

Mr. KEARFUL. And what was the result of the transportation of the Carrancista troops through the United States?

Mr. CAROTHERS. The defeat of Villa in Sonora.

Mr. KEARFUL. Then, what was Villa's attitude?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He seemed to lose control of himself. He was hostile against the Americans for quite a while. He killed quite a number of Americans out in Sonora, and he maltreated Dr. Thigpen of Cananea, who had gone out to volunteer to help his wounded.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you know about the massacre of 19 Americans at Santa Isabel?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Mining men who were going to their mines?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I knew nearly all of them personally. I was in New York at the time of the massacre and was shown the telegram. Before coming East I had personally advised Mr. Watson not to go there. Watson was in charge of the Cusi mines, and Watson asked my opinion as to what he should do, and I told him not to go, but he went anyhow. He went with the American passport, and with the promise of safe conduct of the Carrancista garrison in Chihuahua.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did Villa have anything to do with the massacre according to your information?

Mr. CAROTHERS. To my information he did not, but Pablo Lopez was the man, and the reason I believe Villa did not have anything to do with it is that when he left Chihuahua, when he disbanded his

army in Chihuahua, he made a speech from the window of his palace, when he had his army, that he was no longer in command, that he was a common soldier like the rest of them, and that from then on they were free to do as they pleased.

Mr. KEARFUL. That was before the Santa Isabel affair?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; prior to it.

Mr. KEARFUL. Shortly following that came the raid of Columbus.

Mr. CAROTHERS. I do not recollect the dates, how much time did elapse.

Mr. KEARFUL. Were you in that section of the country at that time?

Mr. CAROTHERS. In Columbus?

Mr. KEARFUL. Yes.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I was in El Paso.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you immediately go to Columbus?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I had been investigating and trying to find out where Villa was, and on the morning of the 8th of March—the Columbus raid occurred on the 9th of March, and on the morning of the 8th I put in a long distance call for Gen. Slocum, who was the commander, intending to go out that afternoon on the 2 o'clock train. But I wanted to get some information from Slocum, if I could, but I did not receive any word from him until after the train had left, so I decided to wait until the next day, and at 6 o'clock he rang me up. I told him that I knew Villa was very close to Columbus; that I did not know what he was doing there, but my information was very positive, and he ridiculed the idea. He said that his information was that Villa was 65 or 70 miles away, and I told him that I knew different, and that I was coming out the next day, and at daylight the raid occurred and I went out the next day on the afternoon train and got to Columbus about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. I examined Mrs. Wright, who claimed that she had been made a prisoner at Casas Grandes, and had been carried off and remained with him for nine days. I examined the prisoners, some six or eight, if I recollect it, and examined the wounded men that we had with the idea of satisfying myself whether Villa had been there or not, if he had led the raid. I also examined two large portfolios of documents that we found, that I recognized as being those of the secretary of Villa, and they contained a great many documents of different kinds, and blank stationery, which were afterwards forwarded to Washington.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you satisfy yourself as to whether or not Villa led that raid?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I satisfied myself that he had gotten as far as the gate, which was only a short distance from the town; but I never satisfied myself that he was actually in the village, but I was positive that he had gotten as far as the gate.

Mr. KEARFUL. You did satisfy yourself that the raid was carried out by a force under Villa's command?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; and that if he did not go into the town, he was at the gate and had directed them to go in.

Mr. KEARFUL. And that he is entirely responsible for what occurred?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I would consider it so; yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you ever hear of any justification that Villa had to give for that?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I have heard that he was urged on by Martin Lopez and Nicolas Fernandez, who were the ruffian generals who had remained with him.

Mr. KEARFUL. Martin Lopez was the man who was in charge of the forces that perpetrated the Santa Isabel massacre?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No; that was his brother, Pablo Lopez, at Santa Isabel.

Mr. KEARFUL. Has Villa ever undertaken to attempt to justify that raid?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Never to me, and never to anyone. I have heard the reference that he had attempted to deny it, but nothing that I could ever—

Mr. KEARFUL. That he had attempted to deny it?

Mr. CAROTHERS. That he had attempted to deny that he was there; but I also heard from another source that he had said that he was there, that he had taken the credit, and that he would stand before the world and be justified in it. He made a statement to the French consul in Torreon, who is now dead. But he told me at one of the times that Villa captured Torreon.

Mr. KEARFUL. On what grounds did he justify the raid?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Bernardino did not attempt to tell me grounds, except the fact that he resented the troops having been permitted to go through the United States?

Mr. KEARFUL. The Carranza troops?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you know anything about the operation of Gen. Cantu in Lower California?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. It has been reported that Cantu practically operates independently of Carranza, whilst Carranza maintains that Cantu is entirely loyal to him. Do you know the truth of that situation?

Mr. CAROTHERS. My impression has always been since Carranza was recognized that Cantu usually recognized him, and that as long as he was let alone in Lower California he would be loyal to him and permit no intervention in his affairs over there.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you have any knowledge of the graft operations of Cantu in Lower California?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; nothing definite that I would testify to.

Mr. KEARFUL. Have you generally kept in touch with the conditions in Mexico since you were there?

Mr. CAROTHERS. As far as possible, yes, sir, I have. Particularly from information coming out from friends who have gone down there, who have told me conditions, and from correspondence with them along the border that has kept me posted.

Mr. KEARFUL. What is your opinion as to whether conditions have been improving or not?

Mr. CAROTHERS. My opinion is that they have not improved, except in some well-defined sections, and that could hardly be an improvement, except in the nature of personal safety.

Mr. KEARFUL. What appears to be the prospects for improvement and the establishment of law and order?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I see no prospects of it now under the present régime.

Mr. KEARFUL. You have been in Mexico a long time and are acquainted with the people, their political and business methods; what do you think should be done to establish a government of law and order there?

Mr. CAROTHERS. That is a hard question to answer. I would like to be excused from answering and giving my ideas as to the settlement of the question.

Mr. KEARFUL. Well, if you think that they are not definite and could not be of value to the committee, you may be excused from giving your opinion as to the remedy, but if you have a definite opinion that you think would be of some value we would like to have it. Do you believe that the Mexicans themselves, without assistance from the outside, can establish a permanent and stable Government?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Do you have a definite opinion as to what should be done by way of assistance from the outside, and who should do it?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I have very definite opinions on that; yes, sir, I have; and they are against armed intervention. I have never advocated armed intervention in Mexico, but I believe that the Mexicans could work out their own salvation if they were to receive the right kind of help from the outside. At the same time, I do advocate a policy of firmness even to the extent of applying some vigorous lesson to them in order to regain the respect that we have lost in Mexico. We did have their respect at one time prior to 1910, but we lost it during this revolution owing to our looseness in defending our people and their properties. I think that could be done even without fighting. I believe if the Mexican people could be brought to realize that the United States was going to demand and get their rights for its citizens, and that they were really brought to feel that, they would change and give it to us. The greatest mistake we ever made was in recognizing Carranza unconditionally and not tying him down when we recognized him to an absolute settlement of the questions that were pending between us. Why, I would recognize no Government in Mexico that did not firmly agree to the settlement of these problems that we have.

Mr. KEARFUL. You think that any government that might be set up should be recognized only on condition that it should follow a certain line prescribed?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. And if it failed to comply with that condition, then, of course, the necessary steps would have to be taken to enforce the conditions.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir; I do. I believe that if that was put to them properly it would be acceptable to them, because those conditions would necessarily be what we internationally expect as one nation having a right to demand from another.

Mr. KEARFUL. Is there any further statement, Mr. Carothers, that you care to make?

Mr. CAROTHERS. I would like to insert in the record one letter that I wrote to Mr. Bryan which shows the spirit in which I undertook my duties down there.

Mr. KEARFUL. Very well.

Mr. CAROTHERS. This letter is dated February 23, 1914, addressed to the Hon. William Jennings Bryan, Washington, D. C. The letter is as follows:

Before leaving for Chihuahua it is my desire to write you a personal letter regarding the work that I have been doing, and that which is mapped out for me in the future.

I wish you to know that my desire to do this work was prompted by my sincere affection for the Mexican people, acquired during 25 years' residence amongst them, and I expect to live the balance of my life in Mexico. I have realized that there is still hope for them to settle their differences without intervention, and it has been my desire to contribute my efforts to further that end.

Such incidents as the Benton execution are most lamentable, and do far-reaching harm to them, but we may expect others to happen before the end of the struggle, where no human help can prevent them. The people are aroused, and it is extremely hard to convince them that they use humanitarian measures with their enemies, especially considering that their enemies treat them only as if they were savages. Villa is absolutely convinced that he did right in executing Benton.

I try and view such instances in as broad a light as possible, knowing the people as I do, although many acts are committed in Mexico to-day by both contending sides that are repulsive in the extreme to civilized people.

My efforts with Villa will be to hold him within bounds as far as possible. I have the honor to be, sir,

Yours obedient servant,

Mr. KEARFUL. Did you endeavor to follow out the course which you stated in that letter?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir,

Mr. KEARFUL. Consistently?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. There is one other incident that I forgot to ask you about, and that is the killing of William Benton. Will you please relate what you know about that incident?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir. I can not recall the date from memory, but one afternoon I was requested by the British residents of El Paso to go to Juarez and find out what had happened to William Benton, who had gone across the river the day before to see Villa and had not returned. Benton's cousin, also named William Benton, told me that his cousin had gone over with the declared purpose of telling Villa what he thought of him. I went to Villa's office and asked him what had happened to Benton. He asked me if I asked him officially, and I told him no, that I was there at the request of the British colony of El Paso. Villa refused to discuss the matter with me, other than to say that Benton was all right, that nothing had happened to him. On my return to El Paso I met Consul Edwards, who handed me a telegram from the Secretary of State, instructing me to investigate Benton's disappearance. Mr. Edwards exhibited a similar telegram that he had also received from the Secretary, giving him practically the same instruction as mine.

Edwards and I decided that, inasmuch as I had just come from Villa on the same subject, it would be well for him to go alone and see what Villa would tell him, and we would compare notes afterwards. Upon his return from interviewing Villa he told me that Villa had told him the whole story in absolute confidence, and that he was unable to tell it to me, but that he was wiring it to Washington that night. I do not know what Villa told him. A few days

later I was handed a copy of the alleged court-martial proceedings under which Benton had been executed, which I also forwarded to Washington. Some months later Gen. Villa was in my car and told me his version of the Benton affair.

He said that Benton had appeared in his office and made threats to him, and used very abusive language; that one word led to another, and finally Benton had reached for his six shooter, but had been overpowered by Ing. Andres Farias and Maj. Bonds; that he was detained in the back room of his office, and that during the afternoon Benton had called him in and had asked him to grant a last request, that he knew that he was going to be shot, but that he wanted Villa's promise to see that his ranch, which was owned by his cousin and himself, was not taken away from Benton's wife, who was a Mexican woman. Villa said that he had promised this, and that he had been paying Benton's widow 300 pesos a month ever since Benton's death. Shall I tell what I was afterwards told by one of the men who was at the execution?

Mr. KEARFUL. Yes.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Later on I was told by one of the men who was present that Benton was killed; that they had taken him to Samalayuca, the first station south of Juarez; and that some of the soldiers had dug a very shallow grave; that Benton protested against the shallowness of the grave, saying that the coyotes would come and dig him out; and that Fierro, who was known as one of the principal killers in the Villa army, had drawn his gun and shot Benton through the head, using a vile expression, but meaning what wonderful courage of this Gringo. The body was buried in this shallow grave. The next part of that is the commission that was formed. There was a commission formed at the request of the American Government.

Mr. KEARFUL. Just proceed to relate that.

Mr. CAROTHERS. Later on the commission of American physicians was selected at the instance of the American Government to view the body of Benton to see if he had been executed, as claimed in the court-martial proceedings. The Mexicans delayed this investigation as long as possible, while they removed the body from the grave, stood it in as upright a position as possible, and fired a volley into it, believing that this would be sufficient proof that his wounds were caused at the time of death. Dr. Andrea Villareal, who was Villa's chief medical officer, told them that any physician would easily recognize the fact that these shots had been fired into a corpse, so he undertook in the city of Chihuahua to prepare the body for its exhibition to the American physicians. This commission arranged to leave Juarez one morning and got as far as the railroad station, when they were met by an officer and told that Carranza had prohibited their trip, and they returned to El Paso.

Mr. KEARFUL. That was at the time when Villa was subordinate to Carranza?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. No examination of the body by these physicians was ever made?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Benton was an English subject?

Mr. CAROTHERS. He claimed to be an English subject; yes, sir.

Mr. KEARFUL. Married to a Mexican woman?

Mr. CAROTHERS. Married to a Mexican woman.

Mr. KEARFUL. I believe that is all I care to ask. Have you anything further that you would like to tell us about before we adjourn?

Mr. CAROTHERS. No, sir; I think not.

Mr. KEARFUL. Very well. The committee is much obliged to you. (Thereupon the committee adjourned at 12.15 o'clock p. m., to meet on Monday, March 1, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)